Some notes: A hundred players are participating in this game (N 100). Each player has to...
A hundred players are participating in this game (N = 100). Each player has to choose an integer between 1 and 100 in order to guess “5/6 of the average of the responses given by all players”. Each player who guesses the integer closest to the 5/6 of the average of all the responses, wins. (a) Find all weakly dominated strategies (if any). (b) Find all strategies that survive the Iterative Elimination of Dominated Strategies (IEDS) (if any). No additional...
Q3 Guess 5/6 of the Average Game A hundred players are participating in this game (N-100). Each player has to choose an integer between 1 and 100 in order to guess "5/6 of the average of the responses given by all players'" Each player who guesses the integer closest to the 5/6 of the average of all the responses, wins (a) Find all weakly dominated strategies (if any). (b) Find all strategies that survive the Iterative Elimination of Dominated Strategies...
Iterated
Iterated elimination of dominated strategies:
Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all
players in the original game.
Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all
players in the modified game where players cannot choose any
strategy that was eliminated at Step 1.
3 Eliminate all strictly (weakly) dominated strategies for all
players in the modified game where players cannot choose any
strategy that was eliminated at Steps 1 and 2.
4 ...
and so on until there are...
4. (a) (10%) A player has three information sets in the game tree. He has four choices in his first information set, four in his second and three in his third. How many strategies does he have in the strategic form? Circle one: (i) 11, (ii) 28 (iii) 48 (iv) 18. (b) (10%) Is it true that the following game is a Prisoners' Dilemma? Explain which features of a Prisoners' Dilemma hold and which do not. (Remember each player must...
3. On the first day of class we played the beauty contest in which n players submitted a number in the interval [0, 10 and the player closest to won (with ties broke by randomization). Here š denotes the average strategy played 3 (a) What strategies survive iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies? (b) What are the Nash equiliburia of the game?
7. Consider the following two player game, with the players being 1 and 2. As usual 1 chooses a row and 2 a column. ABC a 1,4 2,1 3,2 4,1 b 2,3 3,4 4,3 1,2 с 3,1 4,2 1,4 2,3 d 4,2 1,3 4,3 3,2 (a) Which strategies satisfy iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? How many levels of knowledge of rationality do you have to assume to obtain your result? (b) If you were allowed to follow the same...
2. Iterative Deletion of (weakly) Dominated Strategies Consider the following two-player game 2 I c I T 1,1 0,1 3,1 1 M 1,0 2,2 1,3 D 1,3 3,1 2,2 (a) Are there any strictly dominated strategies? Are there any weakly dominated strategies? If so, explain what dominates what and how. (b) After deleting any strictly or weakly dominated strategies, are there any strictly or weakly dominated strategies in the reduced' game? If so, explain what dominates what and how. What...
A group of 7 players play the following game. Each writes down a positive integer that is less than 1000. The player who writes down the smallest number is awarded a prize equal to the number of dollars equal to the number that she wrote down. If there is a tie for smallest number, the prize is divided equally among those who wrote the smallest number. Find the strategy or strategies that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Explain...
3 3 Player Games Suppose there are 3 players, PI, P2 and P3, with feasible strategies S = {U,D), S2 L, R, S3 - {A, B). The payoffs are summarized in the following payoff matrices: Table 3: Payoff Matrices P3 P3 plays A P2 P3 plays B P2 U|3,3,8 1,2,-2 D 0,9,6 -4,13 , -2 ,1 U 11,-1,2 9,5,12 DI 0,1,4 3,-1 , 3 P1 where in an cell the payoff x , y , z corresponds to P1, P2...
2. (5 marks total IEDS practice Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the following games. We will call the row player P1 and the column player P2; note that for each entry in the payoff matrices below, PI's payoff is listed first. Clearly indicate: the order in which you eliminate strategies; whether the eliminated strategy is strictly or weakly dominated; If you find a dominant strategy equilibrium, state what it is. Is it unique? 81 (1,5) 50, -11)...