
Please explain area wise explanation of above mcq, like what is a and what is b, what is marginal revenue and why you select a particular option..?
The problem with cartel is that every firm has an incentive to cheat by lowering price and increasing the market share. And by doing this the firm that is cheating can earn higher revenues than what it was earning in the cartel. Since any deviation from a particular Price quantity point is giving greater value to the firm that is cheating, that's why the initial Cartel price quantity point is not a Nash Equilibrium.
The dotted line above A and B is the price at which the quantity is sold say P. The dotted line below A and B is the MC line. Thus (P-MC) is the mark up. since this is not a perfectly competitive market P not=MC.
selecting a particular option would be difficult since Cost functions are not mentioned. But the concept I have mentioned , I am confident about it
Please explain area wise explanation of above mcq, like what is a and what is b,...
15.2 where a, b > 0 a. Suppose that firms' marginal and average costs are constant and equal to c and that inverse market demand is given by P = a - bQ. Calculate the profit-maximizing price-quantity combination for a monopolist. Also calculate the monopolist's profit. b. Calculate the Nash equilibrium quantities for Cournot duopolists, which choose quantities for their identical products simultaneously. Also compute market output, market price, and firm and industry profits. c. Calculate the Nash equilibrium prices...
3. Cournot model: Quantity competition in simultaneous move homogeneous product duopoly explain in words. The market for bricks consists of two firms that produce identical products. Competition in the market is such that each of the firms simultaneously and independently produces a quantity of output, and these quantities are then sold in the market at a price that is determined by the total amount produced by the two firms. Firm 2 has a patented technology that provides it with a...
16. An industry has two firms. The cost function of Firm 1 is ci(q) 2q + 500, and the cost function of Firm 2 is cz(g) - 2q + 400. The demand function for the output of this industry is a downward-sloping straight line. In a Cournot equilibrium in which both firms produce positive amounts of output: a. Total output of both firms is less than the cartel (joint-profit maximizing) output b. Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce the same...
I only need answers for the Bertrand Nash Equilibrium
section.
please provide answers with as much details as possible. Thank
you
Oligopoly There are two firms competing in the market for Airplanes - Boeing and Airbus. The market demand is given by Q = 120 - P. Boeing has lower Marginal Costs of production than Airbus. Thus MCB = $20, MCA = $40. Assume that TFC = $0 for both firms. (Think of price being in thousands.) Boeing a) Derive...
The marginal revenue curve for a perfectly competitive firm is O A. vertical O B. a straight line coming out of the origin with a 45 degree slope. O C. downward sloping. O D. upward aloping CE horizontal A cartel is a group of firms acting together to output, price, and increase O A. increase; raise; marginal revenue O B. limit; lower; total revenue O c. limit: raise; economic profit O D. increase; raise; economic profit
1. A cartel is a group of firms that attempts to a. maximize joint revenue. b. increase competition. c. behave independently. d. maximize joint profit. 2. If a firm's product loses brand loyalty, then the demand curve will: a. Become less price elastic. b. Shift to the right. c. Become more price elastic. d. Shift to the left. 3. Assume a monopoly confronts the same costs and demand as a competitive industry. In this case, the monopolist produces: a. Less...
4. (25 points) Suppose there are only two firms producing widgets. The total cost function for each firm is identical and is given by Tâ(a = 8h, where gi is the output of firmi A market research company has found that demand for widgets can be described by the inverse demand function P 200 2Q, where Q-q (a) (10 points) A firm's action in the Courot Duopoly game is to choose an output level. Draw each firm's reaction function as...
Please indicate the correct answer and why. Thank you
Bud and Wise are the only two producers of aniseed beer, a New Age product designed to displace root beer. They are rying to figure out how much of this new beer to produce The table shows the payoff matrix (in dollars) for the game that Bud and Wise must play. The Nash equilibrium for this game is that. Bud's strategies red squares) 30,000 gallons 35,000 gallons 130,000 195,000 O A....
Cournot Oligopoly and Number of Firms In a Cournot oligopoly, each firm assumes that its rivals do not change their output based on the output that it produces. Ilustration: A Cournot oligopoly has two firms, YandZ. Yobservesthe market demand curve and the number of units that Z produces. It assumes that Z does notchange its output regardless of the number of units that it (Y) produces, so chooses a production level that maximizes its profits. The general effects of a...
please answer all 10 questions
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Suppose there are only two firms in the marker, firm A and firm B. They produce identical products. Firm A and firm B have the same constant marginal cost, MCA = MCB = ACA = ACB = 25. The market demand function is given by Q = 400 â 4P. a. If the firms practice under the Bertrand model, what will be the Nash equilibrium market price and output level? b. If these two...