Please show all your work.
Your firm has total costs equal to 40Q1. The demand you face is P=4000-5Q.
The second firm now has bad management, increasing its costs to 50Q2. You are still playing Cournot. What is your output and
profits?
Q1 = output of firm 1 and Q2 = output of firm 2
Q = Q1 + Q2
Firm 1:
MR1 = d(PQ1) / dQ1 = 4000 - 10Q1 - 5Q2
MC1 = dC1/dQ1 = 40
Profit is maximized where MR = MC:
10Q1 + 5Q2 = 3960
Firm 2:
MR2 = d(PQ2) / dQ2 = 4000 - 10Q2 - 5Q1
MC2 = dC2/dQ2 = 50
Profit is maximized where MR = MC:
10Q2 + 5Q1 = 3950
Q1 = 264.47
Q2 = 262.67
P = 1363.33
Profit (firm 1) = PQ1 - C1 = 1363.33 x 264.67 - 40 x 264.67 = 350242.2
Please show all your work. Your firm has total costs equal to 40Q1. The demand you...
Please show all your work. Your firm has total costs equal to 40Q1.. The demand you face is P=4000-5Q. Now your firm has a rival firm, with total costs equal to 40Q2. You both play Cournot. What is your output and profits? What is the deadweight loss?
Please show all your work. Your firm has total costs equal to 40Q1. The demand you face is P=4000-5Q. Now your firm has a rival firm, with total costs equal to 40Q2. Now there is a third firm, with total costs equal to 40Q3. All three firms play Cournot. What is your output and profits? What is the deadweight loss?
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Please show all your work. Your firm has total costs equal to 40Q1. Firm 2 has total costs of 50Q2. The demand you face is P=4000-5Q. You are the Stackelberg leader and firm 2 is the Stackelberg follower. What is your output and profits?
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Hello, could you solve
Question3 - Part 3 (the third question) please, Thank you very
much!
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