Answer:
Given:
q = $1,000
Is = $290
Ih = $1,490
E(I) = $1,280
Expected income, E(I) = Is * probability of being sick + Ih * probability of being healthy
Of course, probability of being healthy = 1 - probability of being sick
E(I) = 1280 = 290*P + 1490*(1 - P)
1280 = 290*P + 1490 - 1490*P
(1490 - 290)*P = 1490 - 1280
1200*P = 210
So, P = 210/1200 = 0.175
P = 17.5%
Hence Correct option is 17.5%
solve for p UTHEN Question 6 For 6-9 Given: q = $1,000 Is = $290 1x...
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