My question is In Nash Equilibrium, does x-12 have to be greater than 13, or it can be equal?
Homework Answers
For AD to be NE
X-12>= 13
So, X>=25
If X = 25
| I/II | C | D |
| A | (-2,-2) | (13*,0•) |
| B | (3*,18•) | (13*,13) |
For any value of X
(B,C) is always a NE
So For AD to be NE, X should be Minimum 25
so (X-12) should equal to 13
ao minimum value of X = 25
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