Two firms produce differentiated products with demand curves
p1 = a – q1 – bq2 and p2 = a – q2 – bq1. They both face constant average and marginal cost c and their profit functions are profit = (p1 – c)q1 and profit = (p2 — c)q2, respectively.
Solve the Bertrand game.
Hint: You need to solve the system of equations p1 = a − q1 − bq2 and p2 = a − q2 − bq1 for q1 and q2, which will allow you to write each firm’s profit as a function of prices and its marginal cost.

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Two firms produce differentiated products with demand curves p1 = a – q1 – bq2 and...
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