Question

Follow the same notation as in class. Consider the following game regarding the decision to hold (H), not hold (NH) a currency. Compute:
The Nash equilibrium or equilibria when (H, NH)= (1.5, 0) is changed to (0.5, 0.5).

Firm B Η NH Firm A 1,1 1.5,0 NH 0,1.5 1,1

0 0
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Answer #1

Even then the NAsh equilibrium will not change, Its both holding the currency, of they decide to change the strategy unilaterally they will make a loss of 0.5 before this they were making a loss of 1. Still its a loss, so none of them will change the strategy unilaterally to not holding,

The nash equilibrium is both hold the currency.

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