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Consider the Cournot duopoly model in which two firms, 1 and 2, simul- taneously choose the...

Consider the Cournot duopoly model in which two firms, 1 and 2, simul- taneously choose the quantities they supply, q1 and q2. The price each will face is determined by the market demand function (q1, q2) = a − b(q1 + q2). Each firm has a probability μ of having a marginal unit cost of cL, and a probability 1 − μ of having a marginal unit cost of cH, cH > cL. These probabilities are common knowledge, but the true type is revealed only to each firm individually. Solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

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