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10. Suppose that two firms produce smartphones, one with a soft case and the other with a hard case. To simplify the calculat

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Glun dato one ul-th o Soft Case (Done oAth hold case -) the To uction cast Costtun (a)the bofit -function 481 itmi. 2 api(b)-tte 弌esponse-function-H firm , and 8 2. P, 2 6 SP 61 8.「ち 3 0 (6a2.tua ! 3 0 = 1 9 15 15 LS ts 15 155)2 ID 1.5 02a 15 15 15 P110-20

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