P=160-2Q
Q=q1+q2
MC-20
P=160-2(q1+q2)
P=160-2q1-2q2
TR1=P*Q
TR1=(160-2q1-2q2)q1
TR1=160q1- 2q12
-2q1.q2
MR1=∂(160q1- 2q12
-2q1.q2)/q1
=160-4q1-2q2….MR1
Π1=TR-TC
=160q1- 2q12
-2q1.q2-20q1
∂ Π1/∂q1=160-4q1-2q2-20
Q1=35-.5q2………………….1(best response functions)
TR2=P*Q
TR2=(160-2q1-2q2)q2
TR2=160q2-2q1.q2- 2q22
Π2=TR2-TC2
=160q2-2q1.q2- 2q22
-20q2
∂ Π2/∂q2=160-2q1-4q2-20
4q2=140-2q1
Q2=35-.5q1……2 (best response functions)
Nash equilibrium is always intersection of BRF
Q1=35-.5q2 Q2=35-.5q1
Putting the value of one in another
Q1=35-.5(35-.5q1)
Q1=35-15.5-.25q1
1.25q1=19.5
Q1=15.6-------1
Q2=35-.5(15.6)
Q2=27.2
P=160-2(q1+q2)
P=160-2(15.6+27.2)
P=74.4
Q=42.8
Firm 1 Π1=TR1-TC1
=1160.64-312
Firm 1 Π1=848.64
Firm 1 Π2=TR2-TC2
Firm 2 Π2=1479.68
business economics 4. By using following basic assumptions on Dynamic Bertrand model of vertical separation, find...
usion (24 points) Two firms are playing a repeated Bertrand game infinitely, each with the same marginal cost 100. The market demand function is P-400-Q. The firm who charges the lower price wins the whole market. When both firms charge the same price, each gets 1/2 of the total market. I. Coll A. (6 points) What price will they choose in the stage (only one period) Nash equilibrium? What price will they choose if in the stage game (only one...