A) For identical products, the undercutting of prices will reduce price level down to MC. Hence price level is same and is equal to MC = 120. Quantity is 120 = 200 - 8*Q or Q = 10 units in total and 5 units each bt the two firms. Profits are zero since P = MC and there is no fixed cost
B) Firm with MC = 0 will set a price slightly lower than the MC of the rival, which is therefore less than 150. It will capture the entire market. This firm will produce 150 = 200 - 8Q or 6.25 units and earn a profit of $937. The other firm will not produce any thing
C) Again, Firm with MC = 100 will set a price slightly lower than the MC of the rival, which is therefore less than 120. It will capture the entire market. This firm will produce 120 = 200 - 8Q or 10 units and earn a profit of $1200 approx. The other firm will not produce any thing
2. Suppose two firms are competing in prices (Bertrand) in an industry where demand is P-200-8Q....
Two firms in an industry engaged in Bertrand competition. The industry inverse demand function is p = 40 - 2Q, and marginal cost is MC = 10 for both firms. No firm faces capacity constraints. Find the BertrandNash equilibrium (prices, quantities, profits consumer surplus, total surplus, herfindahl index and lerner index)
Two firms are price-competing as in the standard Bertrand model. Each faces the market demand function D(p)=50-p. Firm 1 has constant marginal cost c1=10 and firm 2 has c2=20. As usual, if one of the firms has the lower price, they capture the entire market, and when they both charge exactly the same price they share the demand equally. 1. Suppose A1=A2={0.00, 0.01, 0.02,...,100.00}. That is, instead of any real number, we force prices to be listed in whole cents....
Consider two firms competing in a market with a demand function P=150-Q. Both firms have constant marginal cost c>0. There are no fixed costs. They compete by setting prices p₁ and p₂ simultaneously. (Bertrand game.) Which of the following statements is not correct? Select one: a. Both firms charging charging p = c is a Nash equilibrium. b. When firm 1 sets where is the industry monopoly price, firm 2's best response is to set . c. When p₁=c, any price p₂≥c...
Problem 4. Bertrand Competition with Different Costs Suppose two firms facing a demand D(p) compete by setting prices simultaneously (Bertrand Competition). Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost ci and Firm 2 has a marginal cost c2. Assume ci < C2, i.e., Firm 1 is more efficient. Show that (unlike the case with identical costs) p1 = (1 and p2 = c2 is not a Bertrand equilibrium.
Suppose that there are two firms in the industry, and they are competing in quantities. The amount of the commodity sold by firm i is qi, i =1,2. The market demand function is given by P = 50 − 3q , where q = q1+q2. The cost functions for each firm is given by TCi =25 + 5qi , i = 1,2. 3.1) Find the profit-maximizing quantity for each firm, and determine each firm’s profit level. 3.2) Suppose that both...
Solve for the equilibrium prices. The widget industry has three firms and is well described by the smooth Bertrand model. Each Firm has a marginal cost of 10 and faces the following demand curve. Qi = 300 – 10Pi + 3Pj + 3Pk for (I,j,k) = (1,2,3) 2. Suppose that Firm 1 and Firm 2 merge. They calculate that merger-related efficiencies will reduce the marginal cost of products 1 and 2 from 10 to 3. The marginal cost of...
Problem 4. Bertrand Competition with Different Costs Suppose two firms facing a demand D(p) compete by setting prices simultaneously (Bertrand Competition). Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost ci and Firm 2 has a marginal cost c2. Assume ci < C2, i.e., Firm 1 is more efficient. Show that (unlike the case with identical costs) p1 = C1 and P2 = c2 is not a Bertrand equilibrium.
Consider a Bertrand duopoly in a market where demand is given by Q firm has constant marginal cost equal to 20 100 - P. Each (a) If the two firms formed a cartel, what would they do? How much profit would eaclh firm make? (6 marks) (b) Explain why the outcome in part (a) is not a Nash Equilibrium. Find the set of Nash Equilibria and explain why it/they constitute Nash equilibria. (6 marks) (c) Now suppose that instead of...
1 (Bertrand Model with sequential move) Consider a Bertrand duopoly model with two firms, Fi and Fa selling two varieties of a product. The demand curve for Fi's product is 91 (pi,P2) = 10-Pl + 0.5p2: and the demand for F's product is where p is the price charged by F). Both firms have a constant marginal cost of (a) Write down the profits of F1 and F2 as a function of prices P1 and P2. You have b) Derive...
Suppose the demand for Pepsi is qp = 54 - 2pp + 1p. The demand for Coke is qc = 54 - 2pc + 1pp. Each firm faces a constant marginal cost of zero. Determine the Bertrand equilibrium prices. What happens to the Bertrand equilibrium prices and profits if increased differentiation causes the demand for Pepsi to become qp = 104 - 2pp + 1pc while the demand for Coke remains unchanged?