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Problems 1 Consider an infinite repetition of the game below, and consider the following strategy, to be used by both players. C) Play C initially, or if C was played in the previous period. (II) If there is a deviation from (I), then play P one time and restart (), (III) If there is a deviation from (II), then restart (II) For what values of δ will players play C forever i C D P C 4,40,6 0,0 D 6,0 2,2 2,0 P 0,0 0,2 1,1
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