

Homework #1 Consider a 3-player setting in which player 1 moves first by choosing among three...
7. Consider a setting where player 1 and player 2 can each take on of two action: put a coin in player 3’s box or not. Player 3 then can either open the box or not. Consider the following variants of the game: a. Player 1 moves first, player 2 sees player 1’s choice and moves second, player 3 sees both choices then acts. Write down the extensive form of this setting. (You can ignore payoffs) b. Player 1 and...
Consider the following game among 4 players. Whenever a player gets to move, she chooses between two actions {L, R}. Player 1 plays first, then player 2, then 3, and player 4 plays last. Player 2 moves knowing 1’s choice. Player 3 moves without knowing 2’s choice but knowing 1’s choice. Player 4 knows 2’s and 3’s choices but does not know the choice of 1. Write an extensive form that represents this information structure (allow for sufficient space and...
3. (15 points) Consider a sequential game with two players with three-moves, in which player 1 moves twice: Player 1 chooses Enter or Erit, and if she chooses Exit the game ends with payoffs of 2 to player 2 and 0 to player 1. • Player 2 observes player l's choice and will have a choice between Fight or Help if player 1 chose Enter. Choosing Help ends the game with payoffs of 1 to both players. • Finally, player...
Player 1 can choose to either play against Player 2 or Player 3. If she chooses to play against Player 2, Player 2 gets to choose between moves X and and Y, and Player 1 picks between moves C and D. If Player 1 chooses to play against Player 3, Player 3 gets a choice between moves S and T, and Player 1 gets to choose between moves E and F. The payoffs for each combination of moves are as...
Consider a game in which, simultaneously, player 1 selects a number x and player 2 select a number y, where x and y must be greater than or equal to 0. Player 1's payoff is U1 = 8x - 2xy - x2 and player 2's payoff is U2 = 4by + 2xy - y? The parameter b is privately known to player 2. Player 1 knows only that b = O with probability 1/2 and b = 4 with probability...
316 r 1) and a potential rival d. For whichv (player 2), are running for the local mayoralty. The incumbeo broad base of support (B) or a small base of support (S). cach probability . The incumbent knows his level of support bunecurring w a rival does not. The incumbent thirst chooses how much soft mon campaign financing: a low quantity (Z) or a high quantity Bayesian equilibria? has either a quantity (H), a decision that campaign financing L thet...
Game: Extensive Form. Suppose player 1 chooses G or H, and player 2 observes this choice. If player 1 chooses H, then player 2 must choose A or B. Player 1 does not get to observe this choice by player 2, and must then choose X or Y. If A and X are played, the payoff for player 1 is 1 and for player 2 it's 5. If A and Y are played, the payoff for player 1 is 6...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
Technology Adoption: During the adoption of a new technology a CEO (player 1) can design a new task for a division manager. The new task can be either high level (H) or low level (L). The manager simultaneously chooses to invest in good training (G) or bad training (B). The payoffs from this interaction are given by the following matrix: Player 2 GB 5,4 -5,2 H Player 1 L 2, -2 0,0 a. Present the game in extensive form (a...
Consider a game between a tax collector (player 1) and a tax payer (player 2). Player2 has an income of 200 and may either report his income truthfully or lie. If he reports truthfully, he pays 100 to player 1 and keeps the rest. If player 2 lies and player 1 does not audit, then player 2 keeps all his income. If player 2 lies and player 1 audits then player 2 gives all his income to player 1. The...