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The chicken game. There are two drivers, both headed for a single lane bridge from opposite directions. The first to swerve a
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Answer #1

answer:

a. the normal form of this chicken game would be:

                                                                                                                 

                                                                                 

                                                                                                                              Player 2

                                                                                                                        Drive              Swerve

Player 1

Drive

0 , 0

5 , 2

Swerve

2 , 5

1 , 1

b. Nash equilibrium of this game would be:

Pure strategy Nash equilibria:

(drive, swerve) and (swerve, drive) with payoffs (5, 2) and (2, 5), where one player swerves to make way while the other player drives straight ahead.

This is because both players gain a higher payoff when they either swerve (and make way for the other) or drive straight ahead (while the other makes way by swerving). So, for player 1, in column 1, 2 is a better strategy than 0 and column 2, 5 is a better strategy than 1. Similarly for player 2, in row 1, 2 is a better strategy than 0, and in row 2, 5 is a better strategy than 1. Hence, (drive, swerve) and (swerve, drive) are the pure strategy Nash equilibria.

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