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In Cournot duopoly , the inverse demand function is P=150-Q Firm 1 and Firm costs are...

In Cournot duopoly , the inverse demand function is P=150-Q

Firm 1 and Firm costs are C1=1000+12q1 and C2=2000+6q2

What is the profit maximization , best reaction function to find Nash equilibrium Price

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