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# A noncompetitive bid for Treasury bill auction provides Multiple Choice a) all noncompetitive bidders the same...

A noncompetitive bid for Treasury bill auction provides

Multiple Choice

a) all noncompetitive bidders the same price.

b) all competitive bidders the same quantity.

c) all noncompetitive bidders lesser price than the competitive bidders.

d) all noncompetitive bidders the same quantity.

e) all competitive bidders the same price.

a) all noncompetitive bidders the same price.

because in this case no rice bid is made by noncompetitive bidders, so all noncompetitive bidders get the same price determined in the auction based on competitive bids

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