Question

A noncompetitive bid for Treasury bill auction provides Multiple Choice a) all noncompetitive bidders the same...

A noncompetitive bid for Treasury bill auction provides

Multiple Choice

a) all noncompetitive bidders the same price.

b) all competitive bidders the same quantity.

c) all noncompetitive bidders lesser price than the competitive bidders.

d) all noncompetitive bidders the same quantity.

e) all competitive bidders the same price.

0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Answer #1

a) all noncompetitive bidders the same price.

the above is answer..

because in this case no rice bid is made by noncompetitive bidders, so all noncompetitive bidders get the same price determined in the auction based on competitive bids

Add a comment
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
A noncompetitive bid for Treasury bill auction provides Multiple Choice a) all noncompetitive bidders the same...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for? Ask your own homework help question. Our experts will answer your question WITHIN MINUTES for Free.
Similar Homework Help Questions
  • In a Treasury auction of $2 billion 182-day par value T-bills, there are $600 million noncompetitive...

    In a Treasury auction of $2 billion 182-day par value T-bills, there are $600 million noncompetitive bids as well as the following competitive bids: Bidder Bid Amount Price $800 million $0.9936 $700 million $0.9938 $300 million $0.9930 $900 million $0.9940 $0.9930 $0.9936 $0.9937 $0.9938 $0.9940

  • Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10...

    Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10 and v2=10. Select all that apply. a. Bidding a value b1 equal to her own valuation vy is a weakly dominated strategy for bidder D. Both bidders submitting bids equal to 10 is a Nash equilibrium. C. One bidder submitting a bid equal to 10 and the other submitting a bid equal to 0 is a Nash equilibrium. d. Both bidders submitting bids equal...

  • Answer for 1 is C and 2 is C, please show and explain how to get it! Table 1 Bidder Bid Amount Price $1,000 $877 S0.9920 S0.9960 $653 S0.9931 $978 S0.9970 $783 S0.9919 1. The Treasury Department want...

    Answer for 1 is C and 2 is C, please show and explain how to get it! Table 1 Bidder Bid Amount Price $1,000 $877 S0.9920 S0.9960 $653 S0.9931 $978 S0.9970 $783 S0.9919 1. The Treasury Department wants to raise S2,650 by selling Treasury bills in an auction The amount of non-competitive bids equals $703. What is the prevailing price in the auction in Table 1? A. S0.9920 B. $0.9960 C. $0.9931 D. S0.9970 E.$0.9919 2. Which competitive bidders were...

  • The Treasury auctioned $2.5 billion par value 91-day T-bills, the following bids were received: Bidder Bid...

    The Treasury auctioned $2.5 billion par value 91-day T-bills, the following bids were received: Bidder Bid Amount Bid Price $500 million $0.9940 $750 million $0.9901 $1.5 billion $0.9925 $1 billion $0.9936 $600 million $0.9939 The Treasury also received $2 billion in noncompetitive bids. Who will receive T-bills and what quantity? от дом A noncompetitive bidders receive $2 billion and bidder I receives $500 million B. noncompetitive bidders receive $1.9 billion and bidder I receives S600 million C. bidder I receive...

  • Consider a first price auction for selling one item. There are n bidders. Each bidder i...

    Consider a first price auction for selling one item. There are n bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation vi for the item, which is privately known and drawn independently from a uniform distribution of interval [0,50]. Each bidder i bids a non-negative real number bi. The bidder who bids the highest number wins and if more than one bidder bid the highest, the winner is chosen uniformly at random. The winner gets the item and pays her bid. All...

  • Four bidders participate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following...

    Four bidders participate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following value to them: V1 = 150,          V2 = 100,          V3 = 90,            V4 = 80 The information above is known to all (i.e., each bidder knows not only his own valuation but also that of the other bidders). If two bidders or more bidders place the same bid, one of them is selected at random to be the winner. Select all that apply a. There's a Nash...

  • Four bidders participate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following...

    Four bidders participate in first price auction for a single object that is of the following value to them: V1 = 150,          V2 = 100,          V3 = 90,            V4 = 80 The information above is known to all (i.e., each bidder knows not only his own valuation but also that of the other bidders). If two bidders or more bidders place the same bid, one of them is selected at random to be the winner. Select all that apply a. There's a Nash...

  • 22) A banker's acceptance is A) a liability of the importer and the importer's hank B)...

    22) A banker's acceptance is A) a liability of the importer and the importer's hank B) for greater than one year maturity. C) a method to help importers evaluate the creditwon D) an add-on instrument. E) a time draft drawn on the exporter's bank evaluate the creditworthiness of exporters. 24) In a Treasury auction, preferential bidding sta A) short sale committed bidders. C) competitive bidders. referential bidding status is granted to B) commercial bank bidders. D) noncompetitive bidders. 25) Which...

  • Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an...

    Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an indivisible object. Denote by vi the value player i attaches to the object; if she obtains the object at the price p her payoff is vi −p. Assume that the players’ valuations of the object are all different and all positive; number the players 1 through n in such a way that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn > 0....

  • Game Theory Eco 405 Homework 2 Due February 20, 2020 1. Find all the Nash equilibria...

    Game Theory Eco 405 Homework 2 Due February 20, 2020 1. Find all the Nash equilibria you can of the following game. LCDR T 0,1 4,2 1,1 3,1 M 3,3 0,6 1,2 -1,1 B 2.5 1.7 3.8 0.0 2. This question refers to a second-price, simultaneous bid auction with n > 1 bidders. Assume that the bidders' valuations are 1, ,... where > > ... > >0. Bidders simultaneously submit bids, and the winner is the one who has the...

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT