10)Consider two firms producing the same good for a common market. Firm 1 has the cost function ofc(q1)=2q1 and firm 2 has the cost function of c(q2)=q2. Assuming they compete as Bertrandduopolists, what price would you expect to prevail?
a)1
b)2.5
c)2
d)3
need explain!
Under the Bertrand Model, firms compete until price becomes equal to MC of production.
MC1 = 2
MC2 = 1
Firm 2 is more efficient , so it will survive the competition. Actual price will be $ 1
Answer: ( A)
10)Consider two firms producing the same good for a common market. Firm 1 has the cost...
2. (30 pts) There are two firms in a market, producing the same good. The firms simultaneously choose their output levels, qı for firm 1 and q2 for firm 2. The price adjusts according to the inverse demand function p= 65 – (91 +92). Each firm has a per-unit (average) cost of 5. Each firm's payoff is its profit. a. (5 pts) Find firm l's profit as a function of qı and q2 (profit equals revenue minus total cost). b....
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