So, lets say that there are 3 groups in a community with 3 respective demand curves for public television.
P1=200-Q1
P2=240-2Q2
P3=320-2Q3
Q1, Q2, and Q3 are the quantities consumed of public television, measured in hours watched) by the three groups. P1, P2, and P3 are “prices” or willingness-to-pay in dollars that each group would pay for hours watched.
Suppose public television is a pure public good that can be produced at a constant marginal cost of MC = 200.
1. What is the (socially) efficient number of public television hours to provide this community
2. What prices would you charge each group respectively if you followed a rule of charging based on willingness to pay?
Hi! Welcome to Chegg!
1.
In case of public good analysis, summation of demands are required to get total willingness to pay:
We have:
P1 + P2 + P3 = 760 - 5Q
Equilibrium:
P = MC
760 - 5Q = 200
5Q = 560
Q = 112 = The (socially) efficient number of public television hours to provide this community.
2.
Keeping different price, quantity for different group requires monopolist's outcome which maximizes profit in each group.
Group 1:
TR = P1Q1 = 200Q1 - Q12
MR = 200 - 2Q1
Equilibrium:
MR = MC
200 - 2Q1 = 200
Q1=0
Market can't be serves as maximum willingness = MC.
Group 2:
TR = P2Q2 = 240Q2 - 2Q22
MR = 240 - 4Q2
Equilibrium:
MR = MC
240 - 4Q2 = 200
4Q2 = 40
Q2 = 10
P = 240 - 2(10) = 220
Group 2:
TR = P3Q3 = 320Q3 - 2Q32
MR = 320 - 4Q3
Equilibrium:
MR = MC
320 - 4Q3 = 200
4Q3 = 120
Q3 = 30
P = 320 - 2(30) = 260
So, lets say that there are 3 groups in a community with 3 respective demand curves...
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