6. Consider a sequential game with 3 players. Player 1 can choose A or B. Player 2 can choose C, D, E, or F (depending on what player 1 chooses). Player 3 can choose G, H, I, J, K, L, M, or N (depending on what player 1 and 2 choose). Player 1 (P1) goes first, player 2 (P2) goes second, and player 3 (P3) goes third. Payoffs are written as the payoffs for P1, P2, and the for P3.
(a) Given the following structure of the game and payoffs, setup the sequential game. Be sure to label all the necessary parts.
For this game there are 8 possible outcomes. Here are the payoffs for those outcomes: If P1 picks A, P2 picks C, P3 picks G then the payoffs (5,6,4). If P1 picks A, P2 picks C, P3 picks H then the payoffs (7,9,6). If P1 picks A, P2 picks D, P3 picks I then the payoffs (11,3,10). If P1 picks A, P2 picks D, P3 picks J then the payoffs (4,8,9). If P1 picks B, P2 picks E, P3 picks K then the payoffs (3,7,4). If P1 picks B, P2 picks E, P3 picks L then the payoffs (6,2,5). If P1 picks B, P2 picks F, P3 picks M then the payoffs (8,4,3). If P1 picks B, P2 picks F, P3 picks N then the payoffs (2,5,2). (5 points)
(b) How many subgames are there in the sequential game you wrote for part a? What are they? Rewrite each subgame in the space below. (4 points)
(c) What is the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game? Show or explain how you know this set of strategies is the subgame perfect equilibrium. (6 points)
(d) Is the subgame perfect equilibrium Pareto optimal? How do you know? State the definition for Pareto optimality in your explanation of you answer. (3 points)
(e) Identify all of the Pareto optimal outcomes. How many are there in total and what outcomes are they? To specify an outcome, you should list the actions that lead to that particular payoff. (4 points)
6. Consider a sequential game with 3 players. Player 1 can choose A or B. Player...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects P1 or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses Pl the payoffs are (12.8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses TI and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20,7); if A chooses T2 and B...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, Tl and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects Pl or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses P1 the payoffs are (12, 8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses T1 and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20, 7); if A chooses T2...
Player 1 can choose to either play against Player 2 or Player 3. If she chooses to play against Player 2, Player 2 gets to choose between moves X and and Y, and Player 1 picks between moves C and D. If Player 1 chooses to play against Player 3, Player 3 gets a choice between moves S and T, and Player 1 gets to choose between moves E and F. The payoffs for each combination of moves are as...
Problem 1. (20 points) Consider a game with two players, Alice and Bob. Alice can choose A or B. The game ends if she chooses A while it continues to Bob if she chooses B. Bob then can choose C or D. If he chooses C the game ends, and if he chooses D the game continues to Alice. Finally, Alice can choose E or F and the game ends after each of these choices. a. Present this game as...
3. (15 points) Consider a sequential game with two players with three-moves, in which player 1 moves twice: Player 1 chooses Enter or Erit, and if she chooses Exit the game ends with payoffs of 2 to player 2 and 0 to player 1. • Player 2 observes player l's choice and will have a choice between Fight or Help if player 1 chose Enter. Choosing Help ends the game with payoffs of 1 to both players. • Finally, player...
Elina has to choose between two projects, P1 and P2. If Elina chooses P1 the game is over and the payoffs are 4 to Elina and 13 to Bonnie. If Elina choose P2, Bonnie observes Elina's choice and then gets to choose between projects P3 and P4. If Elina chooses P2 and Bonnie chooses P3 the payoffs are 2 to Elina and 8 to Bonnie. If Elina chooses P2 and Bonnie chooses P4 the payoffs are 5 and 10 to...
Technology Adoption: During the adoption of a new technology a CEO (player 1) can design a new task for a division manager. The new task can be either high level (H) or low level (L). The manager simultaneously chooses to invest in good training (G) or bad training (B). The payoffs from this interaction are given by the following matrix: Player 2 GB 5,4 -5,2 H Player 1 L 2, -2 0,0 a. Present the game in extensive form (a...
4. Consider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the other player in the first play and, given this, they play it again, and so on. The payoff for the whole game is the sum of the payoffs a player obtains in the T plays of the game A 3,1 4,0 0,1 В 1,5 2,2 0,1 C 1,1 0,2 1,2 (a) (10%) Suppose...
2. consider the following simultaneous move game. Player B LEFT RIGHT Player A UP 4,1 1,4 DOWN 2,3 3,2 a. If there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it and what are the payoffs? b. If there is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, what is it and what are the expected payoffs? 3. Continue with the previous game but suppose this was a sequential game where Player A got to go first. a. Diagram the game...
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage
game twice:
Player 2
Left
Middle
Right
Player 1
Top
4, 3
0, 0
1, 4
Bottom
0, 0
2, 1
0, 0
There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff
in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of
the stage game.
(a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...