Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 128 - 4Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 8Q. The price charged in this market will be: a. $32. b. $48. c. $12. d. $56.
Option (b).
MC1 = MC2 = dC/dQ = 8
P = 128 - 4Q1 - 4Q2
For firm 1,
TR1 = P x Q1 = 128Q1 - 4Q12 - 4Q1Q2
MR1 =
TR1/
Q1
= 128 - 8Q1 - 4Q2
Setting MR1 = MC1,
128 - 8Q1 - 4Q2 = 8
8Q1 + 4Q2 = 120..........(1) (best response, firm 1)
For firm 2,
TR2 = P x Q2 = 128Q2 - 4Q1Q2 - 4Q22
MR2 =
TR2/
Q2
= 128 - 4Q1 - 8Q2
Setting MR2 = MC2,
128 - 4Q1 - 8Q2 = 8
4Q1 + 8Q2 = 120..........(2) (best response, firm 2)
Multiplying (2) by 2,
8Q1 + 16Q2 = 240.........(3)
8Q1 + 4Q2 = 120.........(1)
(3) - (1) gives:
12Q2 = 120
Q2 = 10
Q1 = 10 [since cost function is identical for both firms, Q1 = Q2]
Q = Q1 + Q2 = 20
P = 128 - 4 x 20 = 128 - 80 = 48
Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P...
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