A homogeneous product duopoly faces a market demand function
given by p = 300 - 3Q,where Q = q1 + q2. Both firms have constant
marginal cost MC = 100.
1a. Derive the equation of each firm's quantity reaction
function.
b. What are the Cournot equilibrium quantity and price in this
market? How much does each firm produce?
c. What would be the equilibrium price and quantity in this market if it were perfectly competitive?
d. What would the equilibrium price in this market be if the two firm colluded to set the monopoly price?
e. What is the Bertrand equilibrium price and quantity in this market?
f. Suppose Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader, what is the equilibrium price in this market if Firm 2 plays the follower in this duopoly market? What is the equilibrium quantity? How much does each firm produce?
g. In the diagram below, illustrate the Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg equilibria in parts (b), (e) and (f). Calculate the consumer surplus in each equilibrium.
Graph:
Price for vertical axis, quantity for horizontal axis. Demand line
with a MC horizontal line.
(a)
p = 300 - 3Q = 300 - 3q1 - 3q2
For firm 1,
TR1 = p x q1 = 300q1 - 3q12 - 3q1q2
MR1 =
TR1/
q1
= 300 - 6q1 - 3q2
Setting MR1 = MC,
300 - 6q1 - 3q2 = 100
6q1 + 3q2 = 200..........(1) [reaction function, firm 1]
For firm 2,
TR2 = p x q2 = 300q2 - 3q1q2 - 3q22
MR2 =
TR2/
q2
= 300 - 3q1 - 6q2
Setting MR2 = MC,
300 - 3q1 - 63q2 = 100
3q1 + 6q2 = 200..........(2) [reaction function, firm 2]
(b)
Multiplying (2) by 2,
6q1 + 12q2 = 400.........(3)
6q1 + 3q2 = 200.........(1)
(3) - (1) yields:
9q2 = 200
q2 = 22.22
q1 = (200 - 6q2)/3 [from (1)] = [200 - (6 x 22.22)]/3 = (200 - 133.32)/3 = 66.68/3 = 22.22
Q = 22.22 + 22.22 = 44.44
p = 300 - (3 x 44.44) = 300 - 133.32 = 166.68
(c)
In perfect competition, p = MC.
300 - 3Q = 100
3Q = 200
Q = 66.67
p = MC = 100
(d)
In monopoly, MR = MC.
TR = p x Q = 300Q - 3Q2
MR = dTR/dQ = 300 - 6Q
300 - 6Q = 100
6Q = 200
Q = 33.33
p = 300 - (3 x 33.33) = 300 - 99.99 = 200.01
NOTE_ As per Chegg Answering Policy, 1st 4 parts are answered.
A homogeneous product duopoly faces a market demand function given by p = 300 - 3Q,where...
A homogeneous product duopoly faces a market demand function given by p = 300 - 3Q,where Q = q1 + q2. Both firms have constant marginal cost MC = 100. (part 2) 1a. What is the Bertrand equilibrium price and quantity in this market? 1b. Suppose Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader, what is the equilibrium price in this market if Firm 2 plays the follower in this duopoly market? What is the equilibrium quantity? How much does each firm...
A homogeneous products duopoly faces a market demand function given by P a - Q, where QQ Q2 and a>300. Both firms have constant marginal costs MC-100. There are no fixed costs. a) What is firm 1's optimal quantity given that firm 2 produces an output of 50 units per year? And what is firm's 1 quantity if firm 2 produces 20 units? [4 marks] b) Derive the equation of each firm's reaction function and provide a graphical explanation to...
2. Suppose the market demand curve is P = 40 − 3Q and all firms in the industry face M C = 4 and have no fixed costs. For each of the following situations, calculate the five items: Market Price , Quantity per firm ,Profits per firm ,Consumer Surplus ,Deadweight Loss (a) Uniform pricing monopolist P = Q = π = CS = DWL = (b) Cournot Duopoly P= Q1 = Q2 = π 1 = π2...
Please show step by step.
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P= 600 - 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this Information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Instruction: Do not round Intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm:...
Consider a market where inverse demand is given by P=720-3Q . Marginal costs are zero. What would be the difference between and Stackelberg duopoly equilibrium and a three firm Cournot-Nash equilibrium? 4.
Consider a market where inverse demand is given by P=720-3Q . Marginal costs are zero. What would be the difference between and Stackelberg duopoly equilibrium and a three firm Cournot-Nash equilibrium? 4.
The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 20,000 - 4Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 2,000QL and CF (QF) = 4,000QF.. a. What is the followers reaction function? QF = b. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower. Leader output: Follower output: c. Determine the equilibrium market price. $ d. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower. Leader profits: $ Follower...
The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 22,000 -5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 2,000QL and CF (QF) = 5,000QF.. a. What is the follower’s reaction function? QF = - QL b. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower. Leader output: Follower output: c. Determine the equilibrium market price. $ d. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower. Leader profits: $ Follower...
The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 12,000 -4Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 4,000QL and CF (QF) = 6,000QF.. a. What is the follower’s reaction function? QF= 750 - 0.5 QL b. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower. Leader output: Follower output: c. Determine the equilibrium market price. $ d. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower. Leader profits: $...
can someone help me with question 9?
QUESTION 9 A homogeneous products duopoly faces a market demand function given by P-a-Q, where Q Q1 + Q2 and a-300. Both firms have constant marginal costs MC-100. There are no fixed costs a) What is firm 1's optimal quantity given that firm 2 produces an output of 50 units per year? And what is frm's 1 quantity if firm 2 produces 20 units? 4 marks) b) Derive the equation of each firm's...
Suppose that the market demand curve for mineral water is given as ?=100−10? and marginal cost is fixed at $4. Find the equilibrium price and quantity in each type of different market structure. Show your calculation. a) Monopoly, Cournot duopoly, and Stackelberg duopoly b)Bertrand duopoly (MR is fixed at the level of MC). c) Perfect competitive market (MR is fixed at the level of MC).