Suppose Country 1 and Country 2 each have a firm that exports to countries other than Country 1 or Country 2. In the absence of government intervention, these firms behave as Cournot duopoly. The inverse demand curve in the other countries is P = 36 – q1 – q2. Assume that the firms produce at zero marginal cost.
A) Find out the Cournot equilibrium and calculate each firm’s profit.
B) Suppose that the government in Country 1 can intervene to help its firm without fear that the other government will retaliate. Government 1 gives a subsidy of s = 9 per unit to Firm 1. Find out the Cournot equilibrium and calculate each firm’s profit. Does the subsidy policy increase Country 1’s welfare? (Hint: Country 1’s welfare can be measured by Firm 1’s profit minus Government 1’s subsidy expenditure.)
Suppose Country 1 and Country 2 each have a firm that exports to countries other than...
Question: The U.S. market for automobile is produced by Ford (domestic firm in the US) and Honda (foreign firm in Japan). Suppose that the world consists of only two countries: the U.S. and Japan. The demand curve for automobiles in either country is: Q = 10,000 - P, where Q is the number of cars sold and P is the market price of car. Both Ford and Honda produce at a constant marginal cost of $4,000 per car, and the...
Question: The U.S. market for automobile is produced by Ford (domestic firm in the US) and Honda (foreign firm in Japan). Suppose that the world consists of only two countries: the U.S. and Japan. The demand curve for automobiles in either country is: Q = 10,000 - P, where Q is the number of cars sold and P is the market price of car. Both Ford and Honda produce at a constant marginal cost of $4,000 per car, and the...
The U.S. market for automobile is produced by Ford (domestic firm in the US) and Honda (foreign firm in Japan). Suppose that the world consists of only two countries: the U.S. and Japan. The demand curve for automobiles in either country is: Q = 10,000 - P, where Q is the number of cars sold and P is the market price of car. Both Ford and Honda produce at a constant marginal cost of $4,000 per car, and the two...
The U.S. market for automobile is produced by Ford (domestic firm in the US) and Honda (foreign firm in Japan). Suppose that the world consists of only two countries: the U.S. and Japan. The demand curve for automobiles in either country is: Q = 10,000 - P, where Q is the number of cars sold and P is the market price of car. Both Ford and Honda produce at a constant marginal cost of $4,000 per car, and the two...
The U.S. market for automobile is produced by Ford (domestic firm in the US) and Honda (foreign firm in Japan). Suppose that the world consists of only two countries: the U.S. and Japan. The demand curve for automobiles in either country is: Q = 10,000 - P, where Q is the number of cars sold and P is the market price of car. Both Ford and Honda produce at a constant marginal cost of $4,000 per car, and the two...
Consider a duopoly Cournot game, where Firm 1 and Firm 2 have the same marginal cost of production c = 3. The total quantity produced by the firms is Q. The demand function is p(Q) = 84 − Q. a.) Write down Firm 1’s profit function. b.) * Calculate Firm 1’s best-response function. c.) * Find the pure-strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this game. d.) * Show that the firms make strictly positive profit in equilibrium. e.) Explain intuitively why the...
pls
answer as many qwuestions!!
1. A market has an inverse demand curve and four firms, each of which has a constant marginal cost of. If the firms form a profit-maximizing cartel and agree to operate subject to the constraint that each firm will produce the same output level, how much does each firm produce? 2. Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand curve. Each firm has a marginal cost of $60 per unit. a. What is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium?...
Q4. Suppose a duopoly is characterized by the following profits: if the two firms collude and charge the joint profit-maximizing price, they each earn a profit equal to 1500 in each period; if the two firms charge the Cournot–Nash price, they each earn a profit equal to 1200 in each period; and if one firm defects while the other charges the joint profit-maximizing price, the firm that defects earns 3000 and the other earns 0. [20 marks] a) [3 marks]...
The U.S. market for automobile is produced by Ford (domestic firmin the US) and Honda (foreign firm in Japan). Suppose that the world consists of only two countries: the U.S.and Japan.The demand curve for automobiles in either country is: Q = 10,000-P, where Q is the number of cars sold and P is the market price of car. Both Ford and Honda produce at a constant marginal cost of $4,000 per car, and the two firms compete with each other...
2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...