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There are 2 firms faced in a Bertrand Oligopoly with demand curves as follows: For Firm...

There are 2 firms faced in a Bertrand Oligopoly with demand curves as follows:

For Firm A    QA = 400 – 4PA + 2PB

For Firm B    QB = 240 – 3PB + 1.5 PA

The marginal cost for both firms is Zero

Find the Bertrand Reaction Function for Firm A and the Price for firm A, PA with respect to PB

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