Question

Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 24 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 24 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 12 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward Vote Don't Vote Mr. Ward Vote Mr. Ward: -12, Mrs. Ward: -12 Mr. Ward: 12, Mrs. Ward: -24 Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -24, Mrs. Ward: 12 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to________ and for Mrs. Ward to___________ . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of _________units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility.

Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. True or False:

This agreement would decrease utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question.

True

False

This agreement not to vote ________a Nash equilibrium.

Answer 1

Payoff table

Mr./Mrs	Vote	don't
Vote	(-12*,-12•)	(12*,-24)
Dont	(-24,12•)	(0,0)

NE : ( Vote, Vote)

so 1) MR Ward Vote

2) MRS Ward Vote

3) MR ward payoff -12

4) Mrs Ward payoff -12

_________________________

If both don't vote, each gets 0

So both are better off

false

• agreement not to vote is not a NE