For simplicity we will assume that the end of each round , the loosing player plays the winning player a dollar amount equal to the winning players's score for that round.
Also, we will assume the rules require bob to chose a number other than the one already chosen by Alice.
With Alice choosing 16, bob's optimal reply is 15, but for those choices, the expected value of Alice's score minus bob's score is +0.5 , so Alice will win more points on average, than bob.
If Alice.s chooses 16, and bob chooses any number other than 15, the expected value of Alice's score minus bobs score will be greater than 0.5, so bob best choice is 15, since it minimizes bob's best choice is 15, since it minimizes bob's expected.
Optimal strategies for Bob;
If Alice chooses K with k < 16 , Bob's best reply is K - 1 , which yields a positive expectation for Bob.
Finally, If Alice chooses 16, all choices by bob yield a negative expectation for Bob, but to minimize the expected loss, bob should choose 15.
Player 1 chooses a positive integer x 〉 0 and player II chooses a positive integer y > 0. The pl...
Player 1 and Player 2 choose and integer between 0 and 100. Their choice is made simultaneously and independently. Suppose player 1 chooses x and player 2 chooses y. If x < y Player 1 obtains x and Player 2 obtains zero. Similarly, if y < x Player 2 obtains y and Player 1 obtains zero. If x = y then each one obtains x/2. The number of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is_____________ (Please, enter only a numerical values, for...
Game: Extensive Form. Suppose player 1 chooses G or H, and player 2 observes this choice. If player 1 chooses H, then player 2 must choose A or B. Player 1 does not get to observe this choice by player 2, and must then choose X or Y. If A and X are played, the payoff for player 1 is 1 and for player 2 it's 5. If A and Y are played, the payoff for player 1 is 6...
Consider a game in which, simultaneously, player 1 selects a number x and player 2 select a number y, where x and y must be greater than or equal to 0. Player 1's payoff is U1 = 8x - 2xy - x2 and player 2's payoff is U2 = 4by + 2xy - y? The parameter b is privately known to player 2. Player 1 knows only that b = O with probability 1/2 and b = 4 with probability...
A friend proposes the following guessing game: He chooses an integer between 1 and 100, inclusive, and you repeatedly try to guess his number. He tells you whether each incorrect guess is higher or lower than his chosen number, but you are allowed at most one high guess overall.You win the game when you guess his number correctly. You lose the game the instant you make a second high guess. What is the minimum number of guesses in which you...
Player 2 9 1-9 Question 4: (15pt total] Consider the following game: X Y Player 1 P A 1,3 2,4 1-PB 0,2 8,0 Suppose Player 1 plays A with probability p, and Player 2 plays X with probability q. Let E (-) and E2(-) be the expected payoff functions. 4)a) [8pt total] Calculate the following: 4)a)i) (2pt] E(A) = 4)a)ii) [2pt] E (B) = 4)a)iii) [2pt] E(X) = 4)a)iv) [2pt] E2(Y) = 4)b) (3pt] Indifference strategy for Player 1: Answer:...
1-4 Player 2 2 Question 4: (15pt total] Consider the following game: X Y Player 1 p A1, 32, 4 1-p B 0,28,0 Suppose Player 1 plays A with probability p, and Player 2 plays X with probability q. Let E1 (-) and E2(-) be the expected payoff functions. 4)a) [8pt total] Calculate the following: 4)a)i) (2pt] E1(A) 4)a) ii) (2pt] E1(B) 4)a) iii) [2pt] E2(X) = 4)a)iv) (2pt] E(Y) = 4)b) (3pt) Indifference strategy for Player 1: Answer: 4)c)...
Consider two firms, X and Y in the same industry who use the same production technology. To produce the same level of output, say 1000 pairs of bars, X uses more capital than Y and Y uses more labor than X. Suppose both companies pay the same wage to their employees: w = 15: (Unless otherwise stated, assume that all firms choose their input levels optimally) (a) Which company is paying a lower rent? Why? & Which company has a...
1. Questions (a) Truncations chooses the closest machine number in the direction towards zero. This implies that for positive numbers the result is less or equal than the original mumber while for negative numbers the result of truncation is larger or equal than the original number. Round to nearest chooses the closest machine number. This minimizes the absolute error imtroduced by the rounding (b) 32-bit significant: es 21-32 2-31=0.466 x 10-9. (c) In divisions the maximum relative error is the...
4. (a) (10%) A player has three information sets in the game tree. He has four choices in his first information set, four in his second and three in his third. How many strategies does he have in the strategic form? Circle one: (i) 11, (ii) 28 (iii) 48 (iv) 18. (b) (10%) Is it true that the following game is a Prisoners' Dilemma? Explain which features of a Prisoners' Dilemma hold and which do not. (Remember each player must...
HOMEWORK # 1 (for due date see web page) Consider a simultaneous two-player second-price auction concerning a single indivisible good. The game-frame is as follows: S S ($3, S4, $5, $6, $7 (these are the possible bids), the set of outcomes is the set of pairs (i, p) where ie1,2 is the winner of the auction and p is the price that winner has to pay and the outcome function is as follows (b denotes the bid of Player i):...