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QUESTION Suppose a stage game has exactly one Nash equilibrium (select all that apply) a Any outcome can be supported as a SPNE when the game is repeated infinitely many times and players are patient enough. b. In a finitely repeated game where T becomes large, different outcomes can be supported as SPNE C. The Folk Theorem introduced in the notes assumes that actions are observable. d. In the SPNE of the twice repeated game players play the stage NE in both periods e. In a finitely repeated game where players become more patient results other than the stage NE become feasible.
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