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Exercise 3 A firm detains a monopoly over the production of a good both in North America and in Europe. Suppose that he can produce any level of output at a constant marginal cost of 10$. Demand in North America is DNA(PNA) 55 - PNA while in Europe it is DE(PE)70 H2PE a) If there are no price discrimination possible, what is the optimal price? Find quantities sold in both markets. b) Suppose that there are no arbitrage possible and that the firm can have different (linear) prices. What are the optimal prices and the corresponding quantities? Does that improve total welfare? c) Suppose that consumers can transport the goods from one continent to the other for 58. What are the optimal prices in that case?
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