A COMPANY HAS A BONUS PLAN THAT STATES THAT states that managers with division income ranked below the average of all managers receive no bonus for the year.
What biases might arise in this system?
Managers with income below the average income of all managers receive no bonus. This puts all the managers having income below the average with no bonus at all. And assuming even spread of income across the managers, there will be half of the managers having income below the average income for all the managers.
For example, if there are 4 managers with income of $1000, $1500, $2000 and $2500, the average income comes to $1750. Hence 2 managers fall below the average and will not be eligible to receive bonus.
The biases it will create are:
A COMPANY HAS A BONUS PLAN THAT STATES THAT states that managers with division income ranked...
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financial performance. By itself, however, it does not indicate
whether operating income in the short run was earned by taking
action that would lead to long-run competitive advantage. For
example, a manager might increase short-term operating income by
producing more product while ignoring quality or the amount of
rework. However, the company would like to see an increase in
operating income without sacrificing quality. This problem
illustrates one compensation method that...
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