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Due prior to class discussion 1115/19 consider the P2 following game - A [213 1 8,5 el 6,6 4,2 Find the Nash equilibrium in m
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P2 Left Right Up 8, 5 3 2 , Pl Down 6, 6 4, 2 The Nash equilibria in pure strategies are: (Up, Right)(Down, Left) There exist

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