•(2, 3) Sports c: Celine > ine Comedy (0,0) Sports a: Bob Comedy •(1, 1) Sports...

Question

Question

business economics

Answer 1

Answer #1

Bob Sport comedy Celine comedy sport (3, 2) (el) Teeline comedy sport. (0,0) (2,3) comedy Bob sport Celine celine (3,2) (23)

Answer 2

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