Question

Problem 1. Consider the following extensive form game. 2 > 2,3 4,1 3,2 1.2 (a) By converting the game into normal form game (by finding the corre- sponding bimatrix game), find all Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. (b) Does player 2 have a strictly dominated strategy?

Answer 1

a 141 (213) - X - 14.1) Ciz - Playeri has played '2' (411) because the hus. benefit in playing it this: - Player 2 has playing 'b'. (2,3) and 'd (3,2) w because he has benefit in playing this (213) (3:2) Bolo plupech with choose y (23) strategy I because - player I will choose 'y' (3, 2) strategy 1. because i e e hos benefit in this. ... Thus, the Mash equilibrium is (312). a player 2 doesn't have strictly dominated strategy they have Mibed strategy, becuuse if player 1 have to choose it player 2 position, they player will choose (4.) 'a' and '".