Questions 18-19 refer to the following: There 2 firms in a Cournot Oligopoly market for cell phone service in a Texas county. The market inverse demand function and the total cost functions each of the two firms are as follows: P = 50 – 0.25(Q1 + Q2) (market inverse demand) TC1 = 5 + 10Q1 (total cost function for firm 1) TC2 = 2 + 12Q2 (total cost function for firm 2) 18. Which of the following represents the equilibrium market price, and level of output for firm 1 and firm 2?
a. P = $35 Q1 = 42 Q2 = 42
b. P = $24 Q1 = 56 Q2 = 48
c. P = $24 Q1 = 48 Q2 = 56
d. P = $24 Q1 = 52 Q2 = 52
e. P = $28 Q1 = 36 Q2 = 32
In equilibrium, what will the firm 2 profit equal?
a. 2 = $240
b. 2 = $350
c. 2 = $574
d. 2 = $779
e. 2 = $1,152



Questions 18-19 refer to the following: There 2 firms in a Cournot Oligopoly market for cell...
Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 120-2Q. The total cost function for each firm is TC1(Q) = 4Q1. The total cost function for firm 2 is TC2(Q) = 2Q2. What is the output of each firm? Find: Q1 = ? Q2 = ?
Let market demand for a Cournot duopoly be represented by P=4500-(2Q1+2Q2), while total costs for firm 1 and 2 are respectively, TC1(Q1)=12Q1 2 and TC2(Q2)=12Q2 2 . Calculate equilibrium output, price, and profit of each firm. 10 pts
Questions 10-12 rely on the following prompt: Firm 1 and Firm 2 compete as Cournot duopolists, producing q1 and q2 units of output respectively, such that market output Q=q1+q2. They face market inverse demand of P = 400 − 2Q. Firm 1’s Total cost is given by TC1=2q1^2. Firm 2’s by TC2=2q2^2. 10. What is Firm 1’s equilibrium profit maximizing output level, q1*? 11. What is market output in the Cournot equilibrium for this market (so, what is the value...
question 2 answer needed.
Ql) Consider an oligopoly with 2 firms. The inverse demand curve is given by P- 100- Q1-Q2. Firm 1's total cost function is TC 30Q1. Firm 2's total cost function is TC2 -20Q2. Analyze this using a Cournot model of oligopoly. Find the Nash Equi- librium quantity that each firm produces. Q2) Analyze the demand and cost functions in Question 1 using a Bertrand model of oligopoly where products are identical. Find the Nash equilbrium(a) prices....
1. The inverse market demand is P=100 – 2/3Q. The firms have cost functions TC1 = 15 + 3q1+ q1² TC2 = 20 + q + 2q2² a. Assume there is a multiplant monopoly and TC1 and TC2 represents the cost of production in each plant. How much quantity should each plant produce? b. Find the market price. c. Assume there is a multiplant monopoly. Would it make sense for the firm to close one of the plants? d. Does...
Now consider a typical Cournot duopoly situation such that the market is being served by two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) that simultaneously decide on the level of output to sell in the market, while producing an identical product. The total output of the industry is Q = q1 + q2, where q1 and q2 are the output of Firm 1 and 2, respectively. Each firm has a symmetric cost function: C(q1) = 12 q1 and C(q2) = 12...
3. Two firms in the market, 1 and 2, face an inverse demand function given by P(Q1 +Q2) = 400 – 2Q1 – 202 where Q1 is the level of production of firm 1 and Q2 is the level of production of firm 2. The cost function of firm 1 is C1 (Q1) = (Q1) and the cost function of firm 2 is C2 (Q2) = (Q1). The two firms compete in quantities (i.e., Cournot competition). (a) Set up the...
Consider two firms (Firm A and Firm B) competing in this market. They simultaneously decide on the price of the product in a typical Bertrand fashion while producing an identical product. Both firms face the same cost function: C(qA) = 12qA and C(qB) = 12qB, where qA is the output of Firm A and qB is the output of Firm B. The demand curve is P = 30 - Q. (i) What will be the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price (pB) chosen...
Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 128 - 4Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 8Q. The price charged in this market will be: a. $32. b. $48. c. $12. d. $56.
In the Stackelberg model we saw in class there were two firms 1 and 2. Suppose that the market demand is p(Q) = 60−Q, where as in class Q is the aggregate quantity. The const function for firm 1 is c1(q1) = 10q1 and the cost function for firm 2 is c2(q2) = q2. Firm 1 is the leader and Firm 2 is the follower. (a) Solve for the follow’s reaction function, and the leader’s maximization problem. (b) Describe the...