Exercise 1 Let consider the Cournot game with I = {1, 2}, let the inverse demand...

Question

Question

business economics

Answer 1

Answer #1

p=250-100 R=2500 - 1000 c = 2 + 2q MR = 250-200 , mezaata mc=mR-) 20+2=250-200 220 = 248 Q = 248 = 1113 P = 250-10x11.3 = 137

Answer 2

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