a.= Q=S(1/n-b(P-P*))
Q=100(0.1-0.1P+0.5)
Q=60-10P
R=P.Q
R=60P-10P^2
MR=60-20P
MC=3
Equilibrium condition=MR=MC
60-20P=3
57=20P
P=2.85
Q*=31.5
c. 200(0.05-0.1(P-4))
Q=90-20P
R=90P-20P^2
MR=90-40P
MC=3
MR=MC
90-40P=3
87=40P
P=2.175
NO firm will not produce
d. MC =4
MR=60-20P
MR=MC
60-20P=4
56=20P
P=2.8
Q*=28
60-10P=2
58=10P
P=5.8
Q*=2
MR=90-40P
MC=2
88=40P
P=2.2
Q*=68
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