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5. MBI and Pear are the only two producers of computers. MBI started producing earlier than Pear. MBIs costs of production a(b) Suppose that both firms enter this market at the same time. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium and compare it to the situaFinished part a, just need help with part b

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105 P106- P- 10-비05. then oi-t2-2 (05 0. 105 l05 10-92 = jo5 a yi+2y 105 06-Y2 S0 &R-g01 a105 +9) BR, L42): Colco al i05+1)

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