MBI and Pear are the only two producers of computers. MBI started producing earlier than Pear. MBI's costs of production are given by C1(y1)=y12. Pear's cost function is C2(y2)=5y2. The national demand for computers is y=106-105p.
a) Calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium in which MBI is the leader in this market. Indicate output levels, market price, and the profits of each firm.
b) Suppose that both firms enter this market at the same time. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium and compare it to the situation in part (a).

Y2 *= 249998.125
Total Y = 250001.875
Now P* = 10 -( 250001.875)/105
P= 7.5
Now profit of first firm = 7.5*3.75 - (3.75)2
π1= 14.0625
π2 = (7.5-5)*249998.125
= 624,995.313 answer


MBI and Pear are the only two producers of computers. MBI started producing earlier than Pear....
5.* MBI and Pear are the only two producers of computers. MBI started producing earlier than Pear. MBI's costs of production are given by C1(/1) = y?. Pear's cost function is C2(y2) = The national demand for computers is y 106 - 105p (a) Calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium in which MBI is the leader in this market. Indicate output levels, market price, and the profits of each firm 5y2 (b) Suppose that both firms enter this market at the same...
Finished part a, just need help
with part b
5. MBI and Pear are the only two producers of computers. MBI started producing earlier than Pear. MBI's costs of production are given by C1(/1) = y?. Pear's cost function is C2(y2) The national demand for computers is y = 106 - 105p (a) Calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium in which MBI is the leader in this market. Indicate output levels, market price, and the profits of each firm 5y2 == (b)...
Suppose an industry has a duopoly structure. Duopolist 1 has a cost function given by: c1 (y1) = (y1)2 for y1 ≥ 0 . Duopolist 2 has a cost function given by: c2(y2 ) = 12y2 for y2 ≥ 0. Denoting total output produced in the industry by y = (y1 + y2), the inverse demand function for the good produced in the industry is given by: p = 100 – y Find the reaction function of each duopolist. Using...
please answer all 10 questions
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The answers I filled are wrong.
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