Exercise 12.1
Assume that two companies (C and D) are duopolists that produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function:
P=600−QC−QDP=600−QC−QD
where QCQC and QDQD are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. Total cost functions for the two companies are
TCC=25,000+100QCTCC=25,000+100QC
TCD=20,000+125QDTCD=20,000+125QD
Assume that the firms act independently as in the Cournot model (i.e., each firm assumes that the other firm’s output will not change).
For Company C, the long-run equilibrium output is- , and the selling price is.
For Company D, the long-run equilibrium output is- , and the selling price is.
At the equilibrium output, Company C earns total profits of, and Company D earns total profits of.




Exercise 12.1 Assume that two companies (C and D) are duopolists that produce identical products. Demand...
Exercise 12.2 Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: P=200−QA−QBP=200−QA−QB where QAQA and QBQB, are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. The total cost functions for the two companies are TCA=1,500+55QA+QA2TCA=1,500+55QA+QA2 TCB=1,200+20QB+2QB2TCB=1,200+20QB+2QB2 Assume that the firms act independently as in the Cournot model (i.e., each firm assumes that the other firm’s output will not change)....
Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: P=200−QA−QBP=200−QA−QB where QAQA and QBQB are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. Total cost functions for the two companies are TCA=1,500+55QA+QA2TCA=1,500+55QA+QA2 TCB=1,200+20QB+2QB2TCB=1,200+20QB+2QB2 Assume that the firms form a cartel to act as a monopolist and maximize total industry profits (sum of Firm A and Firm B profits). In...
Assume that two companies (A and B) are Cournot duopolists that produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand function: ? = 200 − ?A − ?B where ?c and ?d are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the price. Total cost functions for the two companies are ??A = 1,500 + 55?A + ?A2 ??B = 1,200 + 20?B + 2?B2 a. Determine the equilibrium price and quantities sold...
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