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Suppose four firms engage in price competition in Bertrand setting in which the lowest-price firm will...

Suppose four firms engage in price competition in Bertrand setting in which the lowest-price firm will capture the entire market. The firms differ with respect to their costs:

? Firm A’s marginal cost per unit is 8 USD

? Firm B’s marginal cost per unit is 7 USD

? Firm C’s marginal cost per unit is 9 USD

? Firm D’s marginal cost per unit is 7.5 USD

(a) Which firm will serve the market? What price it would charge?

(b) Would the equilibrium situation change if firms A and B had greater fixed costs than firms C and D?

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