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Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $16 per unit. Firm 1 faces a demand function of q1 130-2p1+1p2 where q1 is Firm 1s output, p1 is Firm 1s price, and p2 is Firm 2s price. Similarly, the demand Firm 2 faces is 2 130-2P2+ 1p1 Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium. Note that OTI _-130-2p1 + 1p2-2p1 +32-0 op1 and oP2 p 130-2p2+ 1p1-2p2+320 In equilibrium, p1 equals $and p2 eqs (Enter numeric responses using integers.)
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