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Let q1=90-2p1 and q2= 90- 2p2+p1 be the demand function of Firm 1 and Firm 2....

Let q1=90-2p1 and q2= 90- 2p2+p1 be the demand function of Firm 1 and Firm 2. The total cost function of each firm is TC=1000.

(a) Based on Bertrand model, find the equilibrium price for Firm 1.

(b) Based on Bertrand model, find the profit for Firm 1.

(c) Based on Cournot model, find the equilibrium quantity for Firm 2.

(d) Based on Cournot model, find the profit for Firm 2.

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