A).
Consider the given problem here the interest rate is “r=10%=0.1”, => the discount factor is “d=1/1+r=1/1.1”.
B).
Now, given the strategy in the question the payoff of “firm1” if he always produces “1 unit” is given by.
=> (12 + 12*d + 12*d^2 + …..) = 12*(1 + d + d^2 + …..) = 12*(1 + d + d^2 + …..) = 12/1-d = 12/0.0909 = 132.0132.
Now, let’s assume that “firm 1” will produce 1 unit or to produce 1 unit up to date 9 and then switch to 2 units from date 10 onwards, => the payoff of “firm1” is given by.
=> (12 + 12*d + 12*d^2 + 12*d^3 + 12*d^4 + 12*d^5 + 12*d^6 + 12*d^7 + 12*d^8 + 12*d^9 + 50*d^10 + 2*d^11 + 2*d^12 + 2*d^13 + …..).
=> 12*(1-d^10)/(1-d) + 50*d^10 + 2*d^11(1 + d + d^2 + …..).
=> 12*(1-d^10)/(1-d) + 50*d^10 + 2*d^11/(1 - d).
=> 12*0.614457/0.090909 + 19.2772 + 0.700988/0.090909.
=> 81.108405 + 19.2772 + 7.710876 = 108.0965 < 132.0132.
So, here the payoff of producing “1 unit” is more than produce “1 unit” up to date 9 and then switch to 2 units from date 10 onwards, => “firm 1” will produce only “1 units”.
1. Consider the following Cournot game between two firms. In each cell the first number gives...
Joint profit maximizing output and Cournot model
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Joint profit maximizing level of output
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PLEASE HELP ON GRAPH AND LAST QUESTION ONLY
Consider two firms facing the demand curve P-90-5Q, 17 where Q Q1+Q2. The firms' cost functions are C(Q1) 10+501 and C2 (Q2)" 5 + 10Q2 Suppose that both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? Combined, the firms will produce 8.5 units of output, of which Firm 1 will produce 8.5 units and Firm 2 will produce 8 9 10...