Two firms compete in a Cournot homogenous product duopoly. If Firm 1 increases its output, which of the following is true?
Firm 2 will decrease its output and the market price will decrease.
Firm 2 will decrease its output and the market price will increase.
Firm 2 will increase its output and the market price will decrease.
Firm 2 will increase its output and the market price will increase.
Ans isA
If firm 1 increases production then firm 2 will decrease its output. But total output will increase and price will decrease
Two firms compete in a Cournot homogenous product duopoly. If Firm 1 increases its output, which...
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Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P = 200 – 2(Q1 + Q2), where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded by Firm 1, and Q2 is the quantity demanded by Firm 2. The marginal cost and average cost for each firm is constant; AC=MC = $68. The cournot-duopoly equilibrium profit for each firm is
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