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Your company is bidding for a service contract in a second-priced sealed bid auction. You value...

Your company is bidding for a service contract in a second-priced sealed bid auction. You value the contract at $11 million. You believe the distribution of bids will be uniform, with a high value of $14 million and a low value of $3 million. What is your optimal strategy with 10 bidders?

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Answer #1

In second price sealed bid auction

Bidding the true valuation is always the weakly dominant strategy

so optimal strategy is to bid $ 11 million

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