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In the hawk-dove game, at what value of c do doves and hawks have equal payoffs...

In the hawk-dove game, at what value of c do doves and hawks have equal payoffs when doves are extremely rare?
choices: 1, 0, 0.5, or there is no such value
0 0
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Answer #1

In the hawk-dove game, doves and hawks have the equal payoffs if c=0.

1. If V/2 -C >0 Hwak strictly dominates dove.

2. If V/2 -C<0 Both players play Hwak with probability V/2C and with complementary probability.

from 1 and 2 we have the result c=0.

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