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Two firms (A and B) play a simultaneous-move quantity competition game (i.e. Cournot competition) in which...

Two firms (A and B) play a simultaneous-move quantity competition game (i.e. Cournot competition) in which they can choose any Qi ∊ [0, ). The firms have cost functions C(Qi) = 10Qi + 0.5Qi^2, and thus MCi = 10 + Qi. They face a market demand curve of P = 220 – (QA + QB) and have MRi = 220 – 2Qi – Q-i.

a. What is firm A’s profit as a function of QA and QB?

b. What is firm A’s best response to an arbitrary QB selected by firm B?

c. What are the equilibrium QA and QB selected in this game?

d. What is the equilibrium price, and how much profit does each firm collect?

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