


market demand: P = 24 - 0.5Q
Q = 48 - 2P
Demand faced by Sam: Q = 48 - 2P - 24 = 24-2P
P = 12 - 0.5Q
Revenue = P*Q = 12Q - 0.5Q^2
MR = dRevenue/dQ = 12 - Q
Demand - purple, MR - green
Profit maximization is where MR = 0, Q=12, P = 6
market demand: P = 24 - 0.5Q
Q = 48 - 2P
Demand faced by Sam: Q = 48 - 2P - 32 = 16-2P
P = 8 - 0.5Q
Revenue = P*Q = 8Q - 0.5Q^2
MR = dRevenue/dQ = 8 - Q
Demand - purple, MR - green
Profit maximization is where MR = 0, Q=8, P = 4

Nash equilibrium is the intersection of the above 2 lines
24, 12
32, 8
True
2. Cournot competition Aa Aa Consider a town in which only two residents, Sam and Amy,...
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6. Breakdown of a cartel agreement
Consider a town in which only two residents, Tim and Alyssa, own
wells that produce water safe for drinking. Tim and Alyssa can pump
and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total
revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand
schedule for water.
Price
Quantity Demanded
Total Revenue
(Dollars per gallon)
(Gallons of water)
(Dollars)
6.00
0
0
5.50
45
248
5.00
90
450
4.50
135...
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