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(1) Consider the following game: Firm2 0 1 Firmi 0 0,0 0,27 1 27,0 -c, -C 2 27,0 -C, -C 2 0,2 -CT-C -2c, -2c (a) Find all pur
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solution: ( Giren game is firma firm, o I 0,0 0,27 0,21 ato -c, -C CTC 2,0 T-C- Ć -29-20 2 (a) All pure Strategy ne of this g24 making any cost at this point while fim Imaking double profit (271) the firm 2 is not making profit nor facing cost. of thon the basis of this value we can calculate the best response of the firm. The firm a will want to increase the profit whenev- In the mixed Strategy NE at date o fim exit will not occur with the increase in the T as the firm profit for another produc

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