Q = q1 + q2 + q3
Reaction curve firm 1:
MR1 = MC1 = 12
MR1 = dR1/dq1
R1 = pq1 = 24q1 - q12 - q1q2 - q1q3
MR1 = 24 - 2q1 - q2 - q3 = 12
2q1 + q2 +q3 = 12
Firm 2:
Similarly,
2q2 + q1 + q3 = 24 - 15 = 9
Firm 3:
2q3 + q2 + q1 = 9
Solving simultaneously for q1, q2, q3:
q1 = 9/2 and q2 = q3 = 3/2
b)
Profit = Pq - AC X q
P = 24 - (9/2 + 3) = 16.5
Profit (firm 1) = (16.5 - 12) x 4.5 = 20.25
Profit (firm 2) = profit (firm 3) = (16.5 - 15) x 1.5 = 2.25
I. Consider a three firm (n = 3) Cournot oligopoly. The market inverse demand function is...
1. Consider a three firm (n = 3) Cournot oligopoly. The market inverse demand function is p (Q) = 24 Q. Firm 1 has constant average and marginal costs of $12 per unit, while firms 2 and 3 have constant average and marginal costs of $15 per unit. a)Verify that the following are Nash equilibrium quantities for this market: q1 = 9 / 2 and q2 = q3 = 3 / 2 . b)How much profit does each firm earn...
A Cournot oligopoly has 2 firms, and inverse market demand P = 60 - Q. All firms have marginal cost 20 . The equilibrium price in this market will be (PLEASE SHOW ME STEP) $20.50 $22 $33.33 $40.15
Consider the following oligopoly model. The market demand is p(Q) = 100−Q. There are three identical firms 1, 2 and 3 producing the homogeneous product. Each firm has a constant marginal cost of 0. The three firms choose their outputs simultaneously , without observing the quantity decisions by others. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in this model. Obtain the profits in equilibrium for each firm.
Consider a homogeneous-product Cournot oligopoly with four firms. Suppose that the inverse demand function is P(Q) = 64 – Q. Suppose that firms incur a constant marginal cost c = 4. Characterize the equilibrium of the game in which all firms simultaneously choose quantity. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 consider merging and that there are synergies leading to marginal costs cm < c. Characterize the new market equilibrium. At what level of cm are the two firms indifferent whether...
Consider a Cournot competition with two firms, A and B. The marginal costs of each firm is MCA = MCB = 40. The inverse demand function is P = 130 - Q. Find the Nash equilibrium quantities for each firm and the market price.
Exercise: Suppose in a Cournot oligopoly market with n firms, the inverse market demand is p='50 – 0.5Q. Each firm initially produces at a constant MC = 30. a) If a firm invests in R&D that reduces its MC to 20, find the firm's profit from the innovation as a function of number of firms in the market.
Cournot Oligopoly and Number of Firms In a Cournot oligopoly, each firm assumes that its rivals do not change their output based on the output that it produces. Ilustration: A Cournot oligopoly has two firms, YandZ. Yobservesthe market demand curve and the number of units that Z produces. It assumes that Z does notchange its output regardless of the number of units that it (Y) produces, so chooses a production level that maximizes its profits. The general effects of a...
Guided Notes Ant Jble #3: Cournot oligopoly (12 pts) consider a Cournot oligopoly in which the market demand curve is Q-60- P. There are 2 firms in this oligopoly, so this means Q-qi + q2. The firms in this market are not identical: Firm l's cost function is ei(q)= 2q , while Firm 2's cost function is cz(q:)-33q2. a) Write downa profit function for each firm. эрп b) Using your answer to a), find a best-response function for each firm....
Problem 4. Three firms operate in an oligopoly market with inverse demand function given by D(Q)a Q, where Q- 1 42 +q3 and q, represents the quantity produced by firm i. Each firm has constant marginal cost of production c and no fixed cost, assume that 0<c<a. The firms compete in the market by choosing quantities in the following way. Firm 1, the industry leader, chooses gi20. Firms 2 and 3 both observe qi. Firm 2 then chooses q2 2...
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the fertilizer market is P = 1 - where Q = 94 +98. For simplicity, assume that the long-run marginal cost for each firm is equal to X, i.e. C(q)=Xq for each firm. a) Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium where the firms choose output simultaneously b) Find the Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium where firm A as the Stackelberg leader. How much does the leader gain by...