Consider the following version of the p-beauty contest. There are n players, each player can choose a number from {0,1,2}. Players whose choice is closest to 3/4 of the average split $1 between themselves.
(a) Let n = 2. Which of the players' strategies are
rationalizable?
(b) Let n = 3. Which of the players' strategies are rationalizable?
A.In p-beauty contest game ( where p differs from 1 players exhibit distinct.
Here we assume the level of players to easily find out its solution...so firstly we start from the lowest i.e.
''Level 0''players, choose numbers randomly from the interval (0,100) .
the next higher level i.e. ''Level 1'' players believe that all other players are Level 0. These Level 1 players therefore reason that the average of all numbers submitted should be around 50.For example if p= 2/3 then these level 1 players choose as their number ,2/3 of 50 i.e. 33 like as in question;-
a)when n=2 and p=2/4 then these Level 2 players choose as their number 2/4 of 33 i.e. 16.5 As the n increases the players strategies level decreases... as compared to Level 1 ...level 1 strategies are rationalizable.
b) when n=3 and p=3/4 then these Level 3 players choose as their number 3/4 of 16.5 i.e. 12.375 and similarly in this Level 2 strategies are rationalizable.
Consider the following version of the p-beauty contest. There are n players, each player can choose...
3. On the first day of class we played the beauty contest in which n players submitted a number in the interval [0, 10 and the player closest to won (with ties broke by randomization). Here š denotes the average strategy played 3 (a) What strategies survive iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies? (b) What are the Nash equiliburia of the game?
2. Consider the Keynesian Beauty contest we studied in class. (Recall that in this version, as characterized in class, players seek to guess as close as possible to two-thirds of the average, and all players are the same.) (a) Show that each player picking zero is a Nash Equilibrium. (b) Show that that is the unique Nash equilibrium.
A hundred players are participating in this game (N = 100). Each player has to choose an integer between 1 and 100 in order to guess “5/6 of the average of the responses given by all players”. Each player who guesses the integer closest to the 5/6 of the average of all the responses, wins. (a) Find all weakly dominated strategies (if any). (b) Find all strategies that survive the Iterative Elimination of Dominated Strategies (IEDS) (if any). No additional...
Some notes:
A hundred players are participating in this game (N 100). Each player has to choose an integer between 1 and 100 in order to guess "5/6 of the average of the responses given by all players". Each player who guesses the integer closest to the 5/6 of the average of all the responses, wins (a) Q4 Find all weakly dominated strategies (if any). (b) Find all strategies that survive the Iterative Elimination of Dominated Strategies (IEDS) (if any)...
Consider the following version of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game.
The two players have to choose simultaneously between
Rock(R), Paper(P) or Scissors(S).
According to this game, R beats S, S
beats P, P beats R. The winner gets 1
dollar from the other player. In case of a tie,the referee gives
both players 2 dollars. Payoffs for all possible choices are
summarized in the table below. Find all Nash Equilibria.
3) (25 points) Consider the following version of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The...
Q3 Guess 5/6 of the Average Game A hundred players are participating in this game (N-100). Each player has to choose an integer between 1 and 100 in order to guess "5/6 of the average of the responses given by all players'" Each player who guesses the integer closest to the 5/6 of the average of all the responses, wins (a) Find all weakly dominated strategies (if any). (b) Find all strategies that survive the Iterative Elimination of Dominated Strategies...
write clearly please if you’re hand writing.
can’t understand answers sometimes
thanks
2) Consider a general version of the above game with N players from Hawkins, Indiana, each of whom has $10 to contribute to the end described above. All money contributed to the "Destroy the Demogorgon Fund" gets multiplied by an amount B > 1 and then divided equally among all N players from Hawkins, including those who DO NOT contribute. Thus, if all N players contribute $10 to...
6. Consider a sequential game with 3 players. Player 1 can choose A or B. Player 2 can choose C, D, E, or F (depending on what player 1 chooses). Player 3 can choose G, H, I, J, K, L, M, or N (depending on what player 1 and 2 choose). Player 1 (P1) goes first, player 2 (P2) goes second, and player 3 (P3) goes third. Payoffs are written as the payoffs for P1, P2, and the for P3....
4. (a) (10%) A player has three information sets in the game tree. He has four choices in his first information set, four in his second and three in his third. How many strategies does he have in the strategic form? Circle one: (i) 11, (ii) 28 (iii) 48 (iv) 18. (b) (10%) Is it true that the following game is a Prisoners' Dilemma? Explain which features of a Prisoners' Dilemma hold and which do not. (Remember each player must...
5. Consider the payoff matrix below, which shows two players each with three strategies. Player 2 A2 B2 C2 A1 20, 22 24, 20 25, 24 B1 23,26 21,24 22, 23 C1 19, 25 23,17 26,26 Player1 STUDENT NUMBER: SECTION: Page 11 of 12 pages Find all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for this simultaneous choice, one play game. Explain your reasoning. a) b) Draw the game in extended form and solve assuming sequential choice, with player 2 choosing first.